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Abstract
The current Irish legislation for counting of ballots does not fully comply with the true meaning 
of proportional representation by single transferable vote.   This is due to the way in which 
second and subsequent transfers are handled, the legislative requirement to only count the last set 
of ballots transferred and the sensitivity of the counting algorithm to the order in which ballots 
are shuffled.  A formal model of PR-STV is used to identify scenarios in which the counting 
under current electoral laws gives a different result compared to what would have happened 
using another ordering of the same ballots. 
1. INTRODUCTION
The method of Proportional Representation by Single Transferable Vote (PR-STV) achieves 
proportionality through the use of a quota in multi-winner elections.  The quota is calculated so 
that the number of candidates who can achieve a quota of votes is just less than the number of 
seats.  The excess votes above the quota, known as the surplus, are available for re-distribution to 
other candidates, according to the preferences stated on each ballot.  Different implementations 
of PR-STV use different methods for selecting which ballots belong to the surplus.
The Irish implementation of PR-STV is described in Part XIX of the 1992 Electoral Act (see 
Appendix A for the full text).  In it there are two main shortcuts used for allocating the surplus:
• The ballots are divided into sub-piles according to the immediate next preference, but not 
taking account of lower preferences e.g. third and subsequent preferences (section 121 (2))
• When a candidate reaches the quota after receiving vote transfers from another candidate then 
only the last set of transfers received are used when allocating the surplus (section 121 (3))
Meeks found that in the current implementation of PR-STV in Ireland “there is an undesirable 
degree of arbitrariness involved, which has the potential to produce an outcome that violates 
social choice concerns and elect different parliamentarians.” [Meeks 2010]
This has also been noted by several Irish politicians as a reason for reform of PR-STV.
“The defects of the present system have often been pointed out…that the preferences of only 
some candidates are counted…the complicated and arbitrary method of counting and transferring 
votes, introduces a random element into the process and the ultimate result may be far from what 
the electorate really intended. The choice between two effective candidates can depend on the 
relative position of weaker candidates and the chance transfer of sub parcels of votes.”
(Taoiseach Jack Lynch, Dáil Debates 232: 1957, 28 February 1968)
 In additional to the risk of random distortions there are two modes of attack to be considered:
 
•  If the ballots are being shuffled and counted by hand then the order could be altered by 
sleight of hand before the ballots are numbered.
•  If the ballots are cast and counted electronically, then the voting machine could manipulate 
the order of the ballots so as to bias the outcome, even if there is a paper audit trail.
  
2.  MODEL OF THE PR-STV BALLOT COUNTING ALGORITHM
Figure 1 and table 1 describe a model of the PR-STV ballot counting algorithm in such a way as 
to capture the effect of different permutations of the order in which the ballots are counted.  The 
full model, expressed using the Alloy modeling language [Jackson 2006], can be seen in 
Appendix B.  The outcome ‘Shuffle Winner’ in figure 1 refers to a candidate who either wins or 
loses the election depending on the order in which the ballots are shuffled.  The existence of such 
scenarios can be found by using a predicate that there is at least one ‘Shuffle Winner’ not caused 
purely by a random tie break due to equality of votes (section 122 (3) of the legislation).
3.  RESULTS
The order of the shuffle can affect the outcome when there are some ballots with at least 3 
preferences that agree on the top two preferences but diverge on some later preference, where the 
top two preferences refer to winning candidates i.e. to candidates who achieve a surplus of votes.
For example, if the first preference on the ballot turns out to be for the candidate with the first 
quota and the second preference turns out to be for the candidate with the second quota, then the 
influence of the third and subsequent preferences will depend on the position of the ballot in the 
shuffle.  
An example is shown in table 2.  In this example, due to the “last set received” rule, the surplus 
of candidate B is based on the vote transfers received from candidate A, so the ballot with B as 
first preference is never included in B’s surplus regardless of the order of the shuffle.
In order to bias the shuffle during a hand count, a shuffler does not need to know in advance who 
the top two candidates will be.  He or she only needs to ensure that ballots are placed higher in 
the pile if they contain third or subsequent preferences for the shuffler’s favorite candidate.
  
preferences : seq Candidate
Ballot votes: set Ballot
winning: set Shuffle
losing: set Shuffle
outcome: {Winner | Shuffle Winner | Loser}
minimum: number
maximum: number
Candidate
winners: set Candidate
losers: set Candidate
transferGroups: seq Transfer Group
votesReceivedGroups: set Votes Received 
Group
ballots: seq Ballot
results: set Result
Shuffle
donor: Candidate
receiver: Candidate
ballots: set Ballot,
potentialTransfers: set Ballot
shuffle: Shuffle
Distribution
seats: number
quota: number
Election
*
1
*
1
**
*
*
donor: candidate
distributions: set Distribution
transferred: set Ballot
nontransferables: set Ballot
shuffle: Shuffle
continuingCandidates : set Candidate
remainingSeats: number
Transfer Group
*
1
receiver: Candidate
distributions: seq Distribution
ballots: set Ballot
shuffle: Shuffle
Votes Received Group
* 1
*
1
candidate: Candidate
tally: number
received: Votes Received Group
Result
*
1
Figure 1 : Model of the effect of shuffles in PR-STV
Table 1 : Description of the model in figure 1
Entity Field Explanation
Ballot Preferences Sequence of candidates in order of 
preference on a ballot form
  
Entity Field Explanation
Election Seats Number of elected positions to be filled
Election Quota The minimum number of votes received by a 
candidate in order to ensure election
Candidate Votes The set of ballots in which this candidate is 
identified as the first preference
Winning The set of ballot shuffles under which this 
candidate would win the election
Losing The set of ballot shuffles under which this 
candidate would lose the election
Minimum The minimum tally for this candidate, 
including transfers received, under any 
shuffle
Maximum The maximum tally for this candidate, 
including transfers received, under any 
shuffle
Distribution Donor The candidate from which the ballots are 
transferred, either elected with surplus, or 
excluded as lowest continuing candidate
Receiver The continuing candidate to which the 
transfers are made
Ballots The actual ballots transferred from the donor 
candidate to the receiving candidate
Potential 
Transfers
The sub-pile of ballots from which the actual 
ballots were chosen based on the order of the 
shuffle
Shuffle The shuffle in which this distribution happens
  
Entity Field Explanation
Transfer Group Donor The candidate from which the ballots are to 
be transfered
Distributions The set of distributions to each receiving 
candidate
Transferred The set of actual ballots transferred
Nontransferable Ballots that could not be transferred to a 
continuing candidate
Shuffle The shuffle to which this transfer applies
Continuing 
Candidates
The set of continuing candidates who are 
eligible to receive transfers
Remaining Seats The number of positions not yet filled
Votes Received 
Group
Receiver The candidate to whom votes were transfered
Distributions The sequence of distributions from other 
candidates to this candidate
Ballots All ballots receiver by this candidate under 
this shuffle
Shuffle The shuffle in which these vote transfers 
were received
Shuffle Winners The set of candidates who are elected under 
this shuffle
Losers The set of candidates who lose the election 
under this shuffle
Results The numbers of votes received by each each 
candidate under this shuffle
Ballots The order in which the ballots are shuffled
Transfer Groups The sequence in which ballots are transferred
Votes Received 
Groups
The set of groups of distributions received by 
each candidate under this shuffle
  
Entity Field Explanation
Result Candidate The candidate to which this result applies
Votes Received 
Group
The set of distributions in which this 
candidate received votes transfers
Tally The total votes for this candidate including 
original and transferred votes upon election 
or exclusion
Table 2: A small example of different outcomes from the same set of ballots
Ballots
(first > second > third)
Shuffle
(order of ballots)
Result
A > B > C
A > B > D
A > B > C
A > B > D
B > C > D
(3 seats, quota = 2)
A > B > C  before
A > B > D 
Candidate A is elected with 
a surplus of  2 ballots (A > 
B > C), which are 
transferred to B who then 
gets elected with a surplus 
of 1 ballot (A > B > C) 
which is transferred to C 
who gets the last seat.
 A > B > D before
A > B > C
Candidate A’s surplus 
contains 2 ballots (A > B > 
D) and B’s surplus then 
contains 1 ballot (A > B > 
D) which is transferred to 
candidate D.
A > B > C then 
A > B > D then
A > B > C ...
Candidate A’s surplus 
contains 1 each of (A > B > 
C) and (A > B > D) so B’s 
surplus contains either (A 
> B > C) or (A > B > D) 
chosen at random.
4.  CONCLUSIONS
  
 The current system of PR-STV in Ireland is exposed to the risk of a ballot shuffling attack in any 
scenario where a second surplus is distributed.  This risk is partly mitigated by the use of 
traditional paper-based voting instead of electronic voting.  However the attack is still possible to 
a limited extent, if sleight of hand is used during the shuffling and numbering of ballots.  This 
risk could be further reduced by allowing a losing candidate to ask for a full reshuffle as well as a 
full recount.
If Ireland were to re-consider electronic voting in the future, then the vote counting rules will 
need to be redesigned in a way that does not depend on the order in which ballots are counted, 
for example, the use of fractional transfers under the Meek method of STV [Meek 1994], or 
alternatively to compute several possible shuffles (of the same ballots) and then calculate the 
ratio of favorable shuffles to unfavorable shuffles for each candidate.
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APPENDIX A
PART XIX of the Irish 1992 Electoral Act
Rules for the Counting of the Votes
118.—(1) In this Part—
“continuing candidate” means any candidate not deemed to be elected and not excluded;
“count” means—
(a) all the operations involved in the counting of the first preferences recorded for 
candidates;
(b) all the operations involved in the transfer of the surplus of a candidate deemed to be 
elected;
(c) all the operations involved in the transfer of the votes of an excluded candidate; or
(d) all the operations involved in the transfer of the votes of two or more candidates 
together;
  
“deemed to be elected” means deemed to be elected for the purpose of the counting of the votes 
but without prejudice to the declaration of the result of the poll;
“determine by lot” means determine in accordance with the following directions, namely, the 
names of the candidates concerned having been written on similar slips of paper, and the slips 
having been folded so as to prevent identification and mixed and drawn at random, the candidate 
or candidates shall in cases of exclusion be excluded in the order in which their names are drawn, 
and, in cases of surpluses, the surpluses shall be transferred in the order in which the names are 
drawn, and, in cases of equality of fractions, the fraction relating to the candidate whose name is 
first drawn shall be deemed to be the largest;
“non-transferable paper” means a ballot paper on which no second or subsequent preference is 
recorded for a continuing candidate; provided that a paper shall be deemed to have become a 
non-transferable paper whenever—
(a) the names of two or more candidates (whether continuing candidates or not) are marked 
with marks which, in the opinion of the returning officer, indicate the same order of 
preference and are next in order of preference; or
(b) the name of the candidate next in order of preference (whether a continuing candidate or 
not) is marked with a mark which, in the opinion of the returning officer, does not 
follow consecutively after some other mark on the ballot paper, or with two or more 
marks; or
(c) it is void for uncertainty;
“original vote” in regard to any candidate means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which a 
first preference is recorded for that candidate;
“preference” shall be interpreted as follows—
(a) “first preference” means any mark which, in the opinion of the returning officer, clearly 
indicates a first preference;
“second preference” means any mark which, in the opinion of the returning 
officer, clearly indicates a second preference standing in succession to a first 
preference;
“third preference” means any mark which, in the opinion of the returning officer, 
clearly indicates a third preference standing in succession to a second preference 
and so on;
(b) “next available preference” means a preference which, in the opinion of the returning 
officer, is a second or subsequent preference recorded in consecutive order for a 
continuing candidate, the preferences next in order on the ballot paper for candidates 
already deemed to be elected or excluded being disregarded;
“surplus” means the number of votes by which the total number of the votes, original and 
transferred, credited to any candidate, exceeds the quota;
“transferable paper” means a ballot paper on which, following a first preference, a second or 
subsequent preference is recorded in consecutive numerical order for a continuing candidate;
  
“transferred vote” in regard to any candidate, means a vote derived from a ballot paper on which 
a second or subsequent preference is recorded for that candidate.
 
First count.
119.—(1) After the ballot papers have been mixed in accordance with section 114 the returning 
officer shall, rejecting any that are invalid, arrange them in parcels according to the first 
preferences recorded for each candidate.
(2) The returning officer shall then count the number of papers in each parcel and credit each 
candidate with a number of votes equal to the number of valid papers on which a first preference 
has been recorded for such candidate and he shall ascertain the number of all valid papers.
The quota.
120.—(1) The returning officer shall then divide the number of all valid papers by a number 
exceeding by one the number of vacancies to be filled; the result increased by one, any fractional 
remainder being disregarded, shall be the number of votes sufficient to secure the election of a 
candidate and this number is referred to in this Act as “the quota”.
(2) Where at the end of any count the number of votes credited to a candidate is equal to or 
greater than the quota, that candidate shall be deemed to be elected.
Transfer of surplus.
121.—(1) Where at the end of any count the number of votes credited to a candidate is greater 
than the quota, the surplus shall be transferred in accordance with and subject to the provisions 
of this section to the continuing candidate or candidates indicated on the ballot papers in the 
parcel or sub-parcel of the candidate deemed to be elected according to the next available 
preferences recorded thereon.
(2) Where the votes credited to a candidate deemed to be elected whose surplus is to be 
transferred consist of original votes only, the returning officer shall examine all the papers in the 
parcel of that candidate and shall arrange the transferable papers in sub-parcels according to the 
next available preferences recorded thereon.
(3) Where the votes credited to a candidate deemed to be elected whose surplus is to be 
transferred consist of original and transferred votes, or of transferred votes only, the returning 
officer shall examine the papers contained in the sub-parcel last received by that candidate and 
shall arrange the transferable papers therein in further sub-parcels according to the next available 
preferences recorded thereon.
(4) In either of the cases referred to in subsections (2) and (3) the returning officer shall make 
a separate sub-parcel of the non-transferable papers and shall ascertain the number of papers in 
each sub-parcel of transferable papers and in the sub-parcel of non-transferable papers.
(5) Where—
(a) the surplus is equal to the total number of papers in the sub-parcels of transferable 
papers, the returning officer shall transfer each sub-parcel of transferable papers to the 
continuing candidate indicated thereon as the voters’ next available preference,
  
(b) the surplus is greater than the total number of papers in the sub-parcels of transferable 
papers, the returning officer shall proceed as specified in paragraph (a) and shall in 
addition make a sub-parcel of a number of non-transferable papers equal to the 
difference between such total number and the surplus and set the papers therein aside 
as finally dealt with, such papers being, for the purposes of section 127 (1), described 
as non-transferable papers not effective,
and the non-transferable papers or the remaining non-transferable papers, as the case may be, 
also arranged as a sub-parcel shall be placed with the papers of the candidate deemed to be 
elected.
(6) Where the surplus is less than the total number of transferable papers the following 
provisions shall apply:
(a) the returning officer shall transfer from each sub-parcel of transferable papers to the 
continuing candidate indicated thereon as the voters’ next available preference that 
number of papers which bears the same proportion to the number of papers in the 
sub-parcel as the surplus bears to the total number of transferable papers,
(b) the number of papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel shall be ascertained by 
multiplying the number of papers in the sub-parcel by the surplus and dividing the 
result by the total number of transferable papers,
(c) a note shall be made of the fractions (which may be expressed in decimal form), if any, 
in each quotient ascertained in respect of each candidate in accordance with 
paragraph (b) and if, owing to the existence of such fractions, the number of papers 
to be transferred is less than the surplus, so many of these fractions taken in the order 
of their magnitude (beginning with the largest) as are necessary to make the total 
number of papers to be transferred equal to the surplus shall be reckoned as of the 
value of unity and the remaining fractions shall be disregarded,
(d) where two or more fractions are of equal magnitude, and it is not possible for the 
purposes of paragraph (c) to reckon all of the said fractions as of the value of unity, 
that fraction shall be deemed to be the largest which arises from the largest sub-
parcel, and if such sub-parcels are equal in size, that fraction shall be deemed to be 
the largest which relates to the candidate credited with the largest number of original 
votes. Where the numbers of such original votes are equal, regard shall be had to the 
total number of votes credited to such candidates at the first count at which they were 
credited with an unequal number of votes, and the fraction relating to the candidate 
credited with the greatest number of votes at that count shall be deemed to be the 
largest. Where the numbers of votes credited to such candidates were equal at all 
counts the returning officer shall determine by lot which fraction shall be deemed to 
be the largest.
(7) The papers to be transferred from each sub-parcel shall be those last filed in the sub-parcel, 
and each paper so transferred shall be marked to indicate the number of the count at which the 
transfer took place.
(8) The returning officer need not necessarily transfer the surplus of a candidate deemed to be 
elected whenever that surplus, together with any other surplus not transferred, is less than both 
  
the difference between the quota and the number of votes credited to the highest continuing 
candidate and the difference between the numbers of the votes credited to the two lowest 
continuing candidates and either—
(a) the number of votes credited to the lowest candidate is greater than one quarter of the 
quota, or
(b) the sum of the number of votes credited to the lowest candidate together with that 
surplus and any other surplus not transferred is not greater than one quarter of the 
quota.
(9) Where at any time there are two or more surpluses which are to be transferred, the greater 
or greatest of such surpluses shall first be transferred and the remaining surplus or surpluses shall 
then,subject to subsection (8), be transferred in the order of their descending magnitude.
(10) Where two or more candidates have each an equal surplus arising from the same count 
regard shall be had to the number of original votes credited to each candidate and the surplus of 
the candidate credited with the largest number of original votes shall be first dealt with. Where 
the numbers of such original votes are equal regard shall be had to the total number of votes 
credited to such candidates at the first count at which they had an unequal number of votes and 
the surplus of the candidate with the greatest number of votes at that count shall be first dealt 
with. Where the numbers of votes credited to such candidates were equal at all counts the 
returning officer shall determine by lot which surplus he will first deal with.
(11) Subject to subsections (8) and (9), where two or more candidates have a surplus arising 
from different counts, a surplus which arises at the end of any count shall be transferred before a 
surplus which arises at a subsequent count.
Exclusion of candidate.
122.—(1) If at any time no candidate has a surplus (or when under section 121 (8) an existing 
surplus is not transferred) and one or more vacancies remain unfilled, the returning officer shall
—
(a) exclude the candidate credited with the lowest number of votes and examine all the 
papers of that candidate;
(b) arrange the transferable papers in sub-parcels according to the next available preferences 
recorded thereon for continuing candidates and transfer each sub-parcel to the 
candidate for whom the preference is recorded;
(c) make a separate sub-parcel of the non-transferable papers and set them aside as finally 
dealt with, such papers being, for the purposes of section 127 (1), described as non-
transferable papers not effective.
(2) Where the total of the votes of the two or more lowest candidates together with any surplus 
not transferred is less than the number of votes credited to the next highest candidate, the 
returning officer shall in one operation exclude such two or more lowest candidates provided that
—
(a) the number of votes credited to the second lowest candidate is greater than one quarter 
of the quota, or
  
(b) where the number of votes credited to any one of such two or more lowest candidates 
does not exceed one quarter of the quota, it is clear that the exclusion of the 
candidates separately in accordance with subsection (1) and the transfer of any 
untransferred surplus could not result in a number of votes exceeding one quarter of 
the quota being credited to any such candidate.
(3) If, when a candidate has to be excluded under this section, two or more candidates have 
each the same number of votes and are lowest, regard shall be had to the number of original 
votes credited to each of those candidates, and the candidate with the lowest number of original 
votes shall be excluded and where the numbers of the original votes are equal, regard shall be 
had to the total numbers of votes credited to those candidates at the first count at which they had 
an unequal number of votes and the candidate with the lowest number of votes at that count shall 
be excluded and, where the numbers of votes credited to those candidates were equal at all 
counts, the returning officer shall determine by lot which shall be excluded.
Transfer of votes.
123.—(1) Where a transfer of votes is made under section 121 or 122 , each sub-parcel of 
papers transferred shall be placed on top of the parcel, if any, of papers of the candidate to whom 
the transfer is made, and that candidate shall be credited with a number of votes equal to the 
number of papers transferred to him.
(2) If after any transfer a candidate has a surplus, that surplus shall be dealt with in accordance 
with and subject to the provisions of section 121 before any other candidate is excluded.
Filling of last vacancies.
124.—(1) When the number of continuing candidates is equal to the number of vacancies 
remaining unfilled, the continuing candidates shall thereupon be deemed to be elected.
(2) When only one vacancy remains unfilled, and the votes of some one continuing candidate 
exceed the total of all the votes of the other continuing candidates together with any surplus not 
transferred, that candidate shall thereupon be deemed to be elected.
 
APPENDIX B
Alloy Model of PR-STV Ballot Shuffling
/** Candidate outcomes of interest, for any given set of ballots:
 Winner:    Always Elected regardless of order of shuffling
 ShuffleWinner:   Might win depending on the order of the shuffle
 Loser:    Never Elected regardess of order of shuffling */
enum Event {Winner, ShuffleWinner, Loser}
sig Candidate {
      votes:    set Ballot,  -- First preference ballots assigned to this candidate
  
 winning:   set Shuffle,-- Shuffles under which this candidate is elected
 losing:   set Shuffle,-- Shuffles under which this candidate is not elected
 outcome:    Event, -- Overall election result for candidate
 minimum:   Int,  -- Minimum tally under any shuffle
 maximum:   Int  -- Maximum tally under any shuffle
} {
 no shuffle: (losing + winning) | some result: shuffle.results | result.candidate = this and
  result.tally < minimum
 some shuffle: (losing + winning)  | some result: shuffle.results | result.candidate = this and
  result.tally = minimum
 no shuffle: (winning + losing) | some result: shuffle.results | result.candidate = this and
  maximum < result.tally
 some shuffle: (winning + losing) | some result: shuffle.results | result.candidate = this and
  maximum = result.tally
 no s: Shuffle | s in winning & losing
 all w: Shuffle | w in winning implies this in w.winners
 all l: Shuffle | l in losing implies this in l.losers
 outcome = Loser implies (#winning = 0 and #Shuffle = #losing)
 outcome = Winner implies (#losing = 0 and #Shuffle = #winning)
 Election.quota <= #votes implies outcome = Winner
 outcome = ShuffleWinner implies (0 < #winning and 0 < #losing)
 // First preference winners always elected
 Election.quota <= #votes implies outcome = Winner
}
// A ballot contains a list of candidates in order of preference
sig Ballot {preferences: seq Candidate
} {
 0 < #preferences
   not preferences.hasDups
   all c: Candidate | preferences.first = c iff this in c.votes
}
  
// A distribiution is a set of ballots transfered from one candidate to another
sig Distribution {
 donor:   Candidate,  // Candidate excluded or with surplus votes
 receiver:   Candidate,  // Candidate to whom the votes were transferred
 ballots:   set Ballot,  // Actual ballots selected for transfer
 potentialTransfers: set Ballot,  // Potential ballots that might have been selected
 shuffle:   Shuffle  // Shuffle to which this distribution applies
} {
 ballots in potentialTransfers
 // Choice of actual transfers depends on order of shuffle
 all a, p : potentialTransfers | a in ballots and (not p in ballots) implies
  shuffle.ballots.idxOf[a] < shuffle.ballots.idxOf[p]
 // All ballots in a distribution are associated with the candidates in question
 all b: Ballot | b in potentialTransfers implies
  // The receiving candidate is ranked after than the donating candidate
  b.preferences.idxOf[donor] < b.preferences.idxOf[receiver] and
  // The receiver cannot be already the first preference on the ballot 
  receiver in b.preferences.rest.elems
 // This distribution belongs to a transfer group
 some t: TransferGroup | this in t.distributions and t.donor = donor and t.shuffle = shuffle
 // This distribution belongs to a collection of votes received in this shuffle
 some r: VotesReceived | 
  this in r.distributions.elems and r.receiver = receiver and r.shuffle = shuffle
 all r: VotesReceived | 
  (this in r.distributions.elems and r.receiver = receiver) implies r.shuffle = shuffle
 0 < #ballots
}
  
// Groups of transfers from the same candidate, upon either election or exclusion
sig TransferGroup {
 distributions :    set Distribution,
 donor :     Candidate,
 shuffle :     Shuffle,
 continuingCandidates :  set Candidate,
 remainingSeats :   Int,
 transferred :    set Ballot, 
  -- set of ballots transferred to next preference continuing candidate
 nontransferables :   set Ballot 
  -- ballots with no futher preference for any continuing candidate
} {
 all d : Distribution | d in distributions implies d.donor = donor
 this in shuffle.transferGroups.elems
 not donor in continuingCandidates
 0 < remainingSeats and remainingSeats < Election.seats
 remainingSeats < #continuingCandidates
 // A transfer group can be empty if loser had no votes or winner had only surplus
 #distributions = 0 implies no r : VotesReceived | r in shuffle.votesReceived and
  r.receiver = donor and 
  (0 < #donor.votes + #r.ballots or 
  (donor in shuffle.winners and Election.quota < #donor.votes + #r.ballots))
 // Selection of ballots for re-distribution
 some disj x, y : Ballot | x + y in donor.votes and x in transferred and (not y in transferred)
  implies (shuffle.ballots.idxOf[x] < shuffle.ballots.idxOf[y] or y in nontransferables)
 no disj x, y : distributions | x.receiver = y.receiver
 all d : Distribution | d in distributions implies d.receiver in continuingCandidates
  
 no d : Distribution | some b : Ballot | b in nontransferables and 
  d in distributions and b in d.ballots
 no b : Ballot | some c : Candidate | b in nontransferables and
  c in continuingCandidates and
  b.preferences.idxOf[donor] < b.preferences.idxOf [c]
 no b : Ballot | b in transferred & nontransferables
 // Distribution in  favour of the next preference continuing candidate
 no d : Distribution | some b : Ballot | some c : Candidate |
  b in d.ballots and d in distributions and c in continuingCandidates and
  b.preferences.idxOf[c] < b.preferences.idxOf[d.receiver] 
 // Size of surplus from an elected candidate
 some r : VotesReceived | r in shuffle.votesReceived and r.receiver = donor and
  donor in shuffle.winners implies
  ((Election.quota + sum d : distributions | #d.ballots) + #nontransferables = 
  (#donor.votes + #r.ballots)) 
 // Size of transfer from an excluded candidate
 some r : VotesReceived | r in shuffle.votesReceived and r.receiver = donor and
  donor in shuffle.losers implies
  (((sum d : distributions | #d.ballots) + #nontransferables = 
   (#donor.votes + #r.ballots))
  and (nontransferables in donor.votes + r.ballots))
 all b : Ballot | some d : Distribution | d in distributions and b in transferred implies
  (b in d.ballots and d.ballots in transferred)
}
// All sets of vote transfers received by the same continuing candidate
sig VotesReceived {
 distributions : seq Distribution,
  
 receiver : Candidate,
 ballots : set Ballot,
 shuffle : Shuffle
} {
 all d : Distribution | d in distributions.elems implies d.receiver = receiver
 this in shuffle.votesReceived
 all b : Ballot | b in ballots implies 
  some d : Distribution | d in distributions.elems and b in d.ballots
 all d : Distribution | d in distributions.elems implies d.ballots in ballots
 not distributions.hasDups
}
// Final Tally for each candidate
sig Result {
 candidate:  Candidate,
 received:  VotesReceived,
 tally:   Int
} {
 tally = #candidate.votes + #received.ballots
 received.receiver = candidate
}
// The election result for a particular shuffling of the ballots
sig Shuffle {
 ballots:   seq Ballot,   // Ordered set of shuffled ballots
 losers:    set Candidate,  // Failed candidates
   winners:    set Candidate,  // Elected candidates
 results:   set Result,   // Final tally for each candidate
 transferGroups:  seq TransferGroup, // Order of transfers between candidates
 votesReceived:  set VotesReceived
  // Sets of transfers received by each candidate
} {
  
 all c : Candidate | some r : Result | r in results and c = r.candidate
 // All votes received are included in the results
 all v : VotesReceived | some r : Result | 
  r in results and v = r.received and v.receiver = r.candidate
 // No loser has a higher tally than any winner in this shuffle
 no disj loser, winner : results | 
  winner.candidate in winners  and
  loser.candidate in losers and 
  winner.tally < loser.tally
 // First transfer group must either be from highest winner above quota
 transferGroups.first.donor in winners implies 
  Election.quota < #transferGroups.first.donor.votes and
  (no c: Candidate | #transferGroups.first.donor.votes < #c.votes) 
 // or else from lowest continuing candidate (based on first preference votes)
 transferGroups.first.donor in losers implies
  no c: Candidate | #c.votes < #transferGroups.first.donor.votes
 // Each transfer group occurs only once
 not transferGroups.hasDups
  
 // Only continuing candidates can receive transfers
 all disj x, y : TransferGroup | all d : Distribution | x + y in transferGroups.elems and 
  d in y.distributions and x.donor = d.receiver implies
  transferGroups.idxOf[y] < transferGroups.idxOf[x]
 // The number of continuing candidates decreases with each round of transfers
 all disj x, y : TransferGroup | transferGroups.idxOf [x] < transferGroups.idxOf [y] implies
  (y.remainingSeats <= x.remainingSeats and 
  y.continuingCandidates in x.continuingCandidates and
  
  y.donor in x.continuingCandidates)
 // Any non-continuing candidate was a donor in a previous round of transfers
 // unless they had no votes or not surplus
 all c : Candidate | all current : TransferGroup | some previous : TransferGroup | 
  (current + previous in transferGroups.elems
  and transferGroups.idxOf[previous] < transferGroups.idxOf[current] and
  c not in current.continuingCandidates) implies c = previous.donor
 // The number of remaining seats decreases each time that a surplus is transferred
 all disj x, y : TransferGroup | (transferGroups.idxOf [x] < transferGroups.idxOf [y] and
  y.donor in winners) implies
  (y.remainingSeats < x.remainingSeats or #x.distributions = 0)
  
 // Surplus is always taken from the last set received
 all disj surplus, previous : TransferGroup | all partOfSurplus : Distribution |
  (surplus + previous) in transferGroups.elems and
  surplus.donor.outcome = Winner and partOfSurplus in surplus.distributions and
  previous.receiver = surplus.donor and
  transferGroups.idxOf[previous] < transferGroups.idxOf[surplus] and
  partOfSurplus.ballots in previous.transferred implies
  (no other : TransferGroup | some x : Distribution |
  x in other.distributions and x.receiver.outcome = Winner and
  transferGroups.idxOf[previous] < transferGroups.idxOf[other])
 // When candidate is excluded, then all their ballots are available for transfer
 all t : transferGroups.elems | some b : Ballot | t.donor in losers and 
  (b in t.donor.votes or some r : votesReceived | (r.receiver = t.donor and b in r.ballots)) 
  implies ((b in t.nontransferables) or  (some d : t.distributions | b in d.ballots))
 no disj x,y : transferGroups.elems | x.donor = y.donor
 // All shuffles in this scenario are permutations of the same set of ballots
  
 all b: Ballot | b in ballots.elems
 // The same ballot does not appear twice in the shuffle
 not ballots.hasDups
 // All seats have been filled
 #winners = Election.seats
 // No overlap between winners and losers
 no c: Candidate | c in winners and c in losers
 // No missing candidates
 #Candidate = #winners + #losers
 all c: Candidate | c in winners or c in losers
 // Some outcomes are fixed regardless of shuffle
 all w: Candidate | w.outcome = Winner implies w in winners
 all c: Candidate | c.outcome = Loser implies c in losers
}
// The parameters of the election
one sig Election {
 seats: Int,
 quota:  Int
} {
 // There is at least one ballot cast in this election
 0 < #Ballot
 // There is at least one seat and more candidates than available seats
 0 < seats and seats < #Candidate
 // Quota is (1 + (ballots / (1 + seats)))
 quota = 1 + div[#Ballot, seats + 1]
}
-- End.
  
